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THE INTERSECTION OF SPORTS AND DISABILITY: ANALYZING 
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS FOR ATHLETES WITH 
DISABILITIES 
  
MAUREEN A. WESTON* 
I.  INTRODUCTION1 
 When thinking about athletes participating in competitive or organized 
sports, typically the public rarely contemplates the inclusion of players with 
medical impairments or other physical, mental, and learning disabilities.  Yet 
many athletes with disabilities, whether visible or hidden, have achieved 
success in both amateur and professional sports.  Although deaf, Kenny 
Walker attained All-American status as a defensive tackle at the University of 
Nebraska and went on to play professionally with the Denver Broncos.  Jim 
Abbot, who has only one arm as a result of a birth defect, successfully pitched 
in the professional baseball leagues.  The sporting public has applauded the 
accomplishments of these athletes who are able to compete presumably 
“despite” their disabilities or by “overcoming” them.  The awa turned to 
apprehension when Hank Gathers, who was medically cleared to play college 
basketball despite a heart rhythm disorder, died on the court, or when twelve-
year old Michael Montalvo, who has AIDS, sought to enroll in karate classes, 
and even when Magic Johnson returned to professional basketball after 
revealing that  he was HIV positive. 
 The rights of athletes with medical impairments or disabilities to 
participate in competitive sports are also increasingly controversial.  Because 
of a medical impairment or disability, some athletes cannot satisfy certain 
eligibility requirements set by the governing sporting organizations or they 
need accommodation in order to participate.  Recent national attention has 
 
* Associate Professor, Pepperdine University School of Law.  The Author would like to thank the 
Center for Health Law Studies and the St. Louis University Law Journal for their support and 
hosting of the Symposium on Sports Medicine, Doping, Disability and Health Quality, at which 
an early version of this paper was presented. 
 1. This introduction is reproduced with permission, from  Chapter 14, originally authored 
by Maureen A. Weston, of RAY YASSER, JAMES R. MCCURDY, C. PETER GOPLERUD & 
MAUREEN A. WESTON, SPORTS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 817–18 (5th ed. Copyright 2003 
Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.  All Rights Reserved.). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
138 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:137 
focused on Casey Martin, who suffers from a severe congenital disability 
affecting his right leg, in his lawsuit seeking to compel the PGA Tour to permit 
Martin to ride a cart during competitions although all other players are required 
to walk. 
 Athletes who have been effectively excluded from sports participation 
because of a medical impairment or disability have invoked the stringent anti-
discrimination standards of federal disability laws in asserting rights to 
participate and to reasonable modifications of eligibility standards in sports 
programs at the interscholastic, intercollegiate, and professional levels. 
 Federal disability legislation, primarily through the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, which applies to federally funded programs, and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), whose broader coverage reaches most private 
employers and private entities constituting places of public accommodations, 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability and further obligates these 
entities to provide reasonable accommodations, modifications, or auxiliary aids 
that will enable qualified individuals with disabilities to access and to 
participate in the program or activity.  29 U.S.C. § 794; 42 U.S.C. § 12101.  In 
enacting the ADA, Congress found, inter alia, that individuals with disabilities 
continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including “outright 
intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, 
and communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure to make 
modifications to existing facilities, programs and practices, exclusionary 
qualification standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser 
services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs or other opportunities.”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 12101(b).  A goal of these laws, which apply to virtually all sports teams and 
organizations, is to assure the equality of opportunity and full participation for 
individuals with disabilities. 
 Federal disability laws have had and continue to have a significant impact 
in sports, raising complicated and controversial medico-legal questions 
surrounding the rights of individuals with disabilities to participate in athletics 
and the concomitant rights and obligations of the entities regulating athletic 
competition to set and enforce eligibility and safety rules.  Many of the cases 
involving disability law in sports have garnered intense public attention, 
raising questions about the impact on the competitive nature of sports and the 
ability of sporting organizations to enforce rules of participation. 
 II.  PROHIBITIONS ON DISABILITY-BASED DISCRIMINATION AND 
REQUIREMENTS FOR REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION 
A. Historical Treatment of Athletes with Disabilities 
Historically, athletes with medical impairments and disabilities had 
minimal legal recourse to assert rights to participate in competitive sports.  No 
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such rights were recognized at common law, and Constitutional claims against 
exclusion met limited success.  In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,2 
the Supreme Court held that individuals with disabilities were not a quasi-
suspect class.3  As a result, public schools and institutions (as “state actors”) 
could discriminate against or exclude disabled athletes from participation if 
rationally related to a legitimate objective, such as to guard the health and 
safety of athletes.4  On a due process level, there is no fundamental or 
constitutional right to participate in competitive sports.5 
B. Federal Laws Prohibiting Disability-Based Discrimination and Requiring 
Reasonable Accommodation 
The need to recognize the rights of the disabled population began to 
emerge on a national scale in the early 1970s, motivating Congress to enact 
major federal legislation to recognize the civil rights of individuals with 
disabilities.6 
1. The Rehabilitation Act and the ADA 
Federal legislation, beginning with the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and 
followed by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, provides qualified 
disabled individuals with protection against discrimination on the basis of 
disability and requires covered entities to provide reasonable accommodations 
and to modify eligibility criteria that unfairly screen out persons with 
disabilities.7  Recourse may also be available under state law disability-related 
discrimination statutes, but enforcement and remedies vary by state.8  As a 
result, most disability discrimination claims are based on the federal statutes 
rather than on the U.S. Constitution. 
2. Basic Non-discrimination Mandate 
The general prohibition of discrimination provides that “[n]o individual 
shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal 
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
 
 2. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 3. Id. at 442. 
 4. See id. at 446 (“To withstand equal protection review, legislation that distinguishes 
between the [disabled] and others must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
purpose.”); Matthew J. Mitten, Sports Participation by “Handicapped” Athletes, 10 ENT. & 
SPORTS LAW. 15, 17 (1992). 
 5. See Mitten, supra note 4, at 17. 
 6. See Maureen C. Weston, The Road Best Traveled: Removing Judicial Roadblocks that 
Prevent Workers from Obtaining Both Disability Benefits and ADA Civil Rights Protection, 26 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 397 & nn.100–01 (1997). 
 7. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 721, 794 (2000); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, 12112, 12182 (2000). 
 8. See Weston, supra note 6, at 400 & nn.123–25. 
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accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who 
owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.”9 
Unlike other civil rights statutes that prohibit discrimination (for example, 
on the basis of race, age, or gender), federal disability laws also impose an 
affirmative obligation upon covered entities to comply with requests for 
reasonable accommodations, as well as for modification of non-essential 
eligibility criteria.  For example, discrimination is defined by the statute to 
include, inter alia, 
the imposition or application of eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to 
screen out an individual with a disability . . . [and] a failure to make reasonable 
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications 
are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, 
or accommodations to individuals with disabilities.10 
The ADA further requires that these “[g]oods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, and accommodations shall be afforded to an individual 
with a disability in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the 
individual.”11  Exceptions are warranted only where the entity can demonstrate 
that such criteria are necessary or that “making such modifications would 
fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations.”12 
3. Purposes 
Participation in sports was not a specific focus of the federal legislation, 
whose primary intent was to address employment and physical access issues.13  
However, implementing regulations expressly require institutions to provide 
qualified individuals with disabilities an equal opportunity to participate in 
educational and nonacademic activities, including inter-collegiate athletics.14  
Moreover, the legislation’s overarching purpose, to eradicate unfounded 
 
 9. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000) (emphasis added).  The same basic definitions, protections, 
and obligations apply under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.  For ease of reading, references 
to the ADA herein encompass the Rehabilitation Act.  See Weston, supra note 6, at 399 n.115. 
 10. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i)–(ii) (emphasis added). 
 11. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(B) (requiring integrated settings). 
 12. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). 
 13. See id. § 12101; cf. Donald H. Stone, The Same of Pleasant Diversion: Can We Level the 
Playing Field for the Disabled Athlete and Maintain the National Pastime, in the Aftermath of 
PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin: An Empiral Study of the Disabled Athlete, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 377, 
381 (2005) (“It appears that Congress intended to protect athletes with disabilities from 
discrimination in various areas of sports.”).  Stone further notes the application of disability laws 
to athletics at all stages: professional sports leagues, public schools and universities, and athletic 
associations.  Id. 
 14. Maureen A. Weston, Academic Standards or Discriminatory Hoops?  Learning-
Disabled Student-Athletes and the NCAA Initial Academic Eligibility Requirements, 66 TENN. L. 
REV. 1049, 1066 (1999) (citing 34 C.F.R. § 104.47 (2004)). 
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stereotypes and exclusion resulting from overprotective rules and exclusionary 
criteria, and to assert equal opportunity and full participation for persons with 
disabilities,15 is equally applicable in the sports area. 
C. Stating a Disability Rights Claim: An Athlete’s Prima Facie Case 
Athletes with disabilities may seek protection under, and athletic programs 
are required to comply with, either of the two primary federal laws that 
prohibit disability-based discrimination.  To obtain such protection under 
either the ADA or Rehabilitation Act, an athlete must establish four elements.  
First, the program is a “covered entity” under the law.16  Second, the athlete is 
“disabled” within the meaning of the statute.17  Third, the athlete is “otherwise 
qualified” to participate, with or without reasonable accommodation.18  
Finally, the athlete was discriminated against (excluded from participation) 
because of disability.19 
1. Athletic Programs, Leagues, and Organizations as “Covered Entities” 
The initial element of an athlete’s claim must establish that the defendant, 
school, program, or entity is a “covered entity” as defined under either the 
Rehabilitation Act or the ADA.20  The Rehabilitation Act applies to recipients 
of federal funds, which generally include public programs, schools, colleges, 
or universities.21  The ADA broadens the scope of coverage to private entities 
and places of public accommodation.22  The ADA is codified under five titles.  
Title I applies to employment.23  Title II applies to public programs and 
services, here governing entities that are publicly funded at the state or local 
 
 15. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101. 
 16. See, e.g., id. § 12112(a) (prohibiting discrimination in employment). 
 17. See, e.g., id. 
 18. See, e.g., id. 
 19. See, e.g., id. 
 20. See supra text accompanying note 16. 
 21. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000) (requiring nondiscrimination under federal grants and 
programs and providing that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely 
by reason of her or  his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance”). 
 22. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12132, 12182(a) (2000). 
 23. Id. § 12112(a) (“No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with 
a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the 
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other 
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”); id. § 12113(b) (“The term ‘qualification 
standards’ may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health 
or safety of other individuals in the workplace.”). 
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level.24  Title III applies to private entities constituting places of public 
accommodation.25  Public schools and universities are unquestionably covered 
under the mandates of Title II or of the Rehabilitation Act, and private 
universities are also covered under Title III as places of public 
accommodation. 
A highly litigated issue has involved determining whether private sports 
leagues, associations, or athletic standard-setting or membership organizations 
are “places of public accommodation” subject to the ADA.26  The ADA 
defines the term “public accommodation” by listing a host of “private entities” 
with operations that affect commerce.27  The list of private entities includes 
twelve categories, which in turn contain over fifty examples of covered 
facilities, including “a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or 
other place of exercise or recreation.”28 
Some courts strictly interpret the statutory language, holding that the terms 
“facility” and “place” in the ADA require a physical structure.  For example, in 
Elitt v. U.S.A. Hockey,29 a Missouri federal district court held that a youth 
hockey league and its national governing body did not constitute places of 
public accommodation.30  In that case, the league refused to permit a child with 
Attention Deficit Disorder to play hockey.31  In dismissing the claim, the court 
reasoned that the plaintiff had failed to show he was denied access to a place of 
public accommodation simply by alleging that he could not play in the league; 
 
 24. See id. § 12132 (“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such 
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or 
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”); id. § 12131(2) 
(“The term ‘qualified individual with a disability’ means an individual with a disability who, with 
or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices . . . meets the essential 
eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities 
provided by a public entity.”). 
 25. Id. § 12182 (prohibiting discrimination by public accommodations). 
 26. See, e.g., Matthews v. NCAA, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1218 (E.D. Wash. 2001) (“Federal 
courts have struggled with the issue of whether Title III applies to organizations and services not 
directly linked to a physical place or facility.”). 
 27. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7).  The initial portion of the statute reads as follows: “Public 
Accommodation.  The following private entities are considered public accommodations for 
purposes of this subchapter, if the operations of such entities affect commerce—[Subparagraphs 
(A) through (L) list twelve categories of public accommodations].”  Id. 
 28. Id. § 12181(7)(L) (emphasis added). 
 29. 922 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Mo. 1996). 
 30. Id. at 223; see also Brown v. 1995 Tenet ParaAmerica Bicycle Challenge, 959 F. Supp. 
496, 498–99 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that group sponsoring and organizing bike race was not a 
place of public accommodation subject to the ADA and upholding its refusal to permit disabled 
cyclist to participate for his failure to wear a bicycle helmet). 
 31. Elitt, 922 F. Supp. at 218. 
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that is, he had not shown that he was denied access to the ice rink itself.32  The 
Sixth Circuit has reached a similar conclusion, holding that neither a state high 
school athletic association nor the National Football League (“NFL”) were 
“places” of public accommodation, even though association and NFL events 
were held at “places” of public accommodations.33 
Other courts take a broader view, holding that Title III is not limited to 
physical structures.34  For example, in Shultz v. Hemet Youth Pony League, 
Inc.,35 a California federal district court held that a youth baseball league and 
its organizing body were covered by the ADA.36  In so doing, the court ruled 
that “Title III’s definition of ‘place of public accommodation’ is not limited to 
actual physical structures with definite physical boundaries.”37  The court in 
Bowers v. NCAA38 came to a similar conclusion.  Although acknowledging that 
the NCAA is an unincorporated and voluntary membership organization of 
approximately 1,200 postsecondary educational institutions, and not a “place” 
of public accommodation, the Bowers court emphasized that the ADA 
 
 32. Id. at 223; see also Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 
1321 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (holding internet website not a place of public accommodation required to 
accommodate blind person and interpreting that a public accommodation must be a physical, 
concrete structure); Brown, 959 F. Supp. at 498 (noting that “place of public accommodation” is 
defined in the ADA regulations as a “facility” which falls within at least one of twelve listed 
categories and that “facility” is defined as “all or any portion of buildings, structures, sites, 
complexes, equipment, rolling stock or other conveyances, roads, walks, passageways, parking 
lots or other real or personal property, including the site where the building, property, structure or 
equipment is located”). 
 33. See Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1028, 1036–37 (6th Cir. 
1995) (upholding refusal to modify age limit for athlete with learning disabilities); 
Stoutenborough v. Nat’l Football League, Inc., 59 F.3d 580, 583–84 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding the 
NFL and its member clubs do not fall within any of the twelve public accommodation categories 
and dismissing claims by hearing-impaired individuals challenging “blackout rule” barring live 
televised game broadcasts during non sold-out games). 
  In Sandison, the court held that Title III did not apply to high school athletic events 
which occurred at public parks and schools, stating that statutory language limiting places of 
public accommodations to private entities “compel[s] the conclusion that the applicability of 
[T]itle III turns not so much on who is covered: ‘any person’ leasing or operating a place of 
public accommodation is covered[.]”  64 F.3d at 1036.  “The critical inquiry will typically be the 
nature of the place to which the disabled individual alleges unequal access.”  Id. 
 34. See, e.g., Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New Eng., Inc., 
37 F.3d 12, 18–20 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that “public accommodation” within meaning of Title 
III of the ADA includes more than physical structures, thus encompassing a trade association for 
a health benefit plan: “It would be irrational to conclude that persons who enter an office to 
purchase services are protected by the ADA, but persons who purchase the same services over the 
telephone or by mail are not.”). 
 35. 943 F. Supp. 1222 (C.D. Cal. 1996). 
 36. Id. at 1223, 1225. 
 37. Id. 
 38. 9 F. Supp. 2d 460 (D.N.J. 1998). 
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prohibits more than just discrimination based on physical access.39  As the 
chief entity responsible for governing intercollegiate athletics, the NCAA was 
found to control, manage, and regulate participation in intercollegiate sports 
through, inter alia, its eligibility rules.40  Accordingly, the court found the 
NCAA subject to Title III by interpreting “operating” a place of public 
accommodations in terms of the entity’s power to control, manage, or regulate 
the place and conditions causing the alleged discrimination.41 
In PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,42 the Supreme Court of the United States had 
the opportunity to clarify the issue.  In that case, a disabled professional golfer 
sued the PGA, alleging that the PGA’s rule banning the use of golf carts 
violated the ADA.43  The Court held that this rule did, as applied to plaintiff 
Casey Martin, violate the ADA.44  With respect to the coverage issue, the 
Court provided a cursory analysis, noting that the Tour occurred on a golf 
course, which is a type of public accommodation specifically listed in the 
relevant statute,45 and that the PGA “leased” and “operated” golf courses.46  
The PGA admitted that its tournaments were conducted at places of public 
accommodation.47  Even without squarely addressing the debate of whether a 
“place of public accommodation” requires a physical “place,” the Court 
presumed that the ADA applied to the PGA because the Tour leased and 
operated golf courses to conduct its tournaments.48  
Post-Martin, a federal district court held in Matthews v. NCAA49 that the 
NCAA was a “public accommodation” and therefore subject to Title III of the 
ADA, due to the NCAA’s close connection with stadiums and physical 
facilities.50  The court concluded that the “NCAA’s policies and eligibility 
criteria in fact have a direct link to a place: a football stadium, which provides 
 
 39. Id. at 467, 483, 488. 
 40. Id. at 487–89. 
 41. See id. at 486; see also Weston,  supra note 14, at 1090–91. 
 42. 532 U.S. 661 (2001). 
 43. Id. at 664–65. 
 44. Id. at 690; see discussion infra Part III.C. 
 45. PGA, 532 U.S. at 677 (citing Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L) 
(2000)). 
 46. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)).  By the time the case had reached the Supreme Court, 
the PGA had essentially abandoned its earlier argument that the tour was a private club and thus 
altogether exempt from Title III’s coverage.  Id. at 677–78; see also Martha Lee Walters & 
Suzanne Bradley Chanti, When the Only Way to Equal Is to Acknowledge Difference: PGA Tour, 
Inc. v. Martin, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 727, 735–36 (2002) (noting that “with little plumbing, the Court 
determined that the PGA was indeed a place of public accommodation covered by Title III and 
Casey Martin was a person entitled to its benefits”). 
 47. PGA, 532 U.S. at 677. 
 48. Id. 
 49. 179 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (E.D. Wash. 2001). 
 50. Id. at 1223. 
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a place of exercise and a public gathering—a public accommodation explicitly 
enumerated in the ADA’s text.”51  Although the Supreme Court did not 
squarely address the application of Title III to non-physical, standard-setting 
athletic organizations or associations, the broad interpretation taken by courts 
in subsequent decisions indicates a trend to hold organizations that effectively 
“control” access to participation via participation and eligibility rules within 
the definition of place of public accommodation under the ADA.52  Thus, a 
sports league or organization may be subject to Title III where it “operates” a 
place of public accommodation by controlling participation via league rules.53 
2. The “Disabled” Athlete 
Assuming an athlete overcomes the initial hurdle of establishing that the 
particular entity or organization is covered by federal law, the athlete seeking 
protection under the ADA must be “disabled” within the meaning of the 
statute.54  This requires that the athlete has “a physical or mental impairment 
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such 
individual.”55  The ADA’s regulations describe “major life activities” as 
“functions such as caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, 
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.”56  This definition 
excludes individuals with temporary injuries, medical impairments, or 
disabilities that do not substantially limit a major life activity.57 
With respect to athletes excluded from sports participation based on 
permanent medical ineligibility, a critical inquiry is whether sports 
participation is a “major life activity.”  An athlete may also argue that the list 
of major life activities is non-exhaustive, leading the parties to argue whether 
participation in sports is a major life activity or integral to learning.  For 
example, the Seventh Circuit has held that although a student was medically 
ineligible to play college basketball because of a heart condition, he was not 
 
 51. Id.; see also Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 483–84 (D.N.J. 1998); Shultz v. 
Hemet Youth Pony League, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 1222, 1225 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that youth 
baseball league and its organizing body were covered by the ADA: “Title III’s definition of ‘place 
of public accommodation’ is not limited to actual physical structures with definite physical 
boundaries. . . . Defendants are a ‘place of public accommodation’ under the ADA irrespective of 
their link to any physical facilities.”). 
 52. See Matthews, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1218–20. 
 53. See, e.g., Neff v. Am. Dairy Queen Corp., 58 F.3d 1063, 1066 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(interpreting “operate” with its “ordinary and natural meaning. . . . [which is to] control or direct 
the functioning of[;] . . . [t]o conduct the affairs of; manage”) (citations omitted). 
 54. See supra text accompanying note 17. 
 55. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000); see also id. § 12102 
(2)(B)–(C) (including individuals with “a record of such impairment” or “being regarded as 
having such an impairment”). 
 56. 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(ii) (2005). 
 57. See id. § 104.3(j)(1). 
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“disabled” because he was only limited in playing intercollegiate athletics, by 
itself not a major life activity.58  Perhaps where the exclusion from athletics is 
framed as substantially limiting the major life activity of learning or working, 
the disability prong is more easily satisfied.  For example, athletes with 
learning disabilities are covered because their impairments restrict the major 
life activity of learning.59  A professional athlete excluded because of disability 
could also link the limitation to the life activity of working.  However, 
exclusion from working at a particular job has not been considered a 
substantial limitation on working.60 
A person is also “disabled” under the ADA where such individual has a 
“record of such impairment; or . . . [is] regarded as having such an 
impairment.”61  This definition may cover athletes excluded on the basis of a 
record of a medical impairment or genetic predisposition for a medical risk. 
3. Who is “Otherwise Qualified with or Without Reasonable 
Accommodation”? 
An apparent irony is that the athlete pursuing an ADA claim must not only 
be “disabled,” but also “otherwise qualified” to participate in the athletic 
program.62  Such an athlete is qualified if he or she can meet essential program 
eligibility requirements “with or without reasonable modifications to [the 
program’s] rules, policies, or practices.”63 
4. Excluded Because of Disability 
Finally, the athlete must prove that he or she was discriminated against or 
excluded from participation because of disability.64  As mentioned previously, 
discrimination is defined to include 
the imposition or application of eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to 
screen out an individual with a disability . . . from fully and equally enjoying 
any good, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations, 
unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary . . . [and] a failure to make 
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures . . . to individuals 
with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such 
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such [programs].65 
 
 58. Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 480–81 (7th Cir. 1996); see also discussion 
infra Part III.C. 
 59. See Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 475–76 (D.N.J. 1998). 
 60. See, e.g., Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415, 1419 (10th Cir. 1992) (explaining that 
major life activity does not necessarily mean working at a particular job such as firefighting). 
 61. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B)–(C) (2000). 
 62. See id. § 12132. 
 63. Id. § 12131(2) (defining “[q]ualified individual with a disability”). 
 64. See supra text accompanying note 19. 
 65. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i)–(ii) (emphasis added). 
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D. In Defense, Legally Valid Justifications for Exclusion 
In defense, exclusion is permissible where the requested accommodation 
or modification is unreasonable, requires the elimination of essential eligibility 
requirements, poses an undue hardship on the program, or fundamentally alters 
the nature of the sport or competition.66  More recently, courts have ruled that 
an entity need not permit participation where such poses a direct threat to the 
player or others.67  Whether participation would pose a risk of harm to the 
player or to others is a recurring issue facing many athletic programs when an 
athlete has an increased risk of injury. 
III.  TYPE OF LEGAL CHALLENGES BY ATHLETES WITH DISABILITIES 
The disability rights issue arises primarily in three types of cases.  The first 
occurs where athletes with high medical risk seek to participate.  Liability and 
safety concerns prevail where such players obtain medical clearance and die or 
are injured while participating in the sports program, or where the players are 
denied medical clearance to play and sue claiming disability-based 
discrimination.  The second category involves athletes who fail to meet a 
“neutral” eligibility requirement, such as age or academic standards and are 
denied participation in athletics.  A third category involves athletes who need 
accommodation or modification to the rules of play in the particular sport. 
A. Athletes with High Medical Risk Seek to Participate v. Protective 
Concerns 
Athletic programs, as well as courts, have to consider the eligibility and 
participation rights of athletes with high medical risks balanced with the 
program’s right to establish safety standards.  A prerequisite to participating in 
nearly any competitive athletic program is obtaining medical clearance and 
signing medical release waivers.  Challenges arise when athletes are willing to 
execute medical release and liability waivers, but are excluded from 
participation based on team assessments of medical ineligibility. 
For example, in Knapp v. Northwestern University,68  the university 
refused to allow Nick Knapp to play on the school’s Division I basketball team 
based on the team physician’s determination that Knapp was medically 
ineligible because of his increased risk of cardiac death, even while playing 
with an internal defibrillator.69  Knapp sued Northwestern under the 
 
 66. See id. 
 67. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 68. 101 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 69. Id. at 476–77.  Nick Knapp was rated one of the best high school players in Illinois.  Id. 
at 476.  At the end of his junior year, Northwestern offered him a basketball scholarship.  Id.  
During a pick-up game his senior year, Knapp had a sudden cardiac arrest where his heart 
stopped.  Id.  Paramedics were able to revive him through electric shock.  Id.  Doctors thereafter 
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Rehabilitation Act, arguing that he was discriminated against because of his 
actual or perceived disability.70  The case raised a variety of questions, such as: 
Was Knapp “disabled” by virtue of his increased risk of severe cardiac injury, 
i.e., was he substantially limited in a major life activity and when can a 
significant risk of future physical injury permissibly disqualify a person from 
sports participation?  When the parties’ medical experts disagree, who should 
decide on an acceptable level of risk?  Is it sufficient that Knapp was willing to 
sign liability waivers and assume the personal risks (supported by his 
physicians)? 
At trial, five medical experts testified, disagreeing only on the issue of 
whether, even with an internal defibrillator, the risk of cardiac death was 
acceptable.71  The district court enjoined Northwestern from excluding Knapp 
from playing on the team due to his cardiac condition.72  The district court 
found that intercollegiate sports are integral to a student’s education and 
learning process, and at a minimum, constituted a major life activity for 
Knapp.73  In concluding that Northwestern was in violation of the 
Rehabilitation Act, the district court stated the following: 
Hardly a year goes by that there is not at least one instance of tragic death of a 
healthy youth as a result of competitive sports activity.  Life has risks.  The 
purpose of [the law], however, is to permit handicapped individuals to live life 
as fully as they are able, without paternalist authorities deciding that certain 
activities are too risky for them.74 
 
implanted a cardio defibrillator in his abdomen designed to detect heart arrhythmia and restart his 
heart in the event of a recurrence.  Id.  Northwestern agreed to honor the scholarship but refused 
to allow him to play, finding him medically ineligible per the instruction of the team physician.  
Id. at 476–77.  Knapp and his parents were willing to sign liability releases and had his own team 
of experts testify that the level of risk was acceptable.  Id. at 476, 478. 
 70. Id. at 477, 478. 
 71. Id. at 484. 
 72. Id. at 487. 
 73. Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 942 F. Supp. 1191, 1195 (N.D. Ill. 1996).  By affidavit, 
Knapp stated: 
My participation in competitive basketball has provided me and could continue to provide 
me with a unique experience that I have not encountered in any other extracurricular 
activity in which I have been involved . . . . Among other things, competitive basketball 
has helped to instill in me the following character traits: confidence, dedication, 
leadership, teamwork, discipline, perseverance, patience, the ability to set priorities, the 
ability to compete, goal-setting and the ability to take coaching, direction and criticism. 
Id.; see also Pahulu v. Univ. of Kan., 897 F. Supp. 1387, 1392–93 (D. Kan. 1995) (applying a 
subjective test, acknowledging that athletic participation could significantly contribute to a 
student’s learning). 
 74. Knapp, 942 F. Supp. at 1197 (quoting Poole v. S. Plainfield Bd. of Ed., 490 F. Supp. 
948, 953–54 (D.N.J. 1980)). 
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On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed.75  First, the court held that Knapp, 
although disqualified on the basis of medical ineligibility, was not 
“disabled.”76  Although Knapp’s medical condition potentially substantially 
limits him in “all” major life activities—if his heart stops—the court analyzed 
his protection under grounds argued by the parties, ultimately ruling that 
Knapp, although medically ineligible, was not “disabled” under federal 
disability law because he was not substantially limited in a major life activity 
(which the parties framed as learning).77  Although the district court found that 
participation in sports was a major life activity integral to Knapp’s education, 
the Seventh Circuit applied an objective, as opposed to subjective, standard of 
whether participation in sports is integral to one’s learning.78 
Even assuming Knapp were disabled, the court held that Knapp was not 
“qualified” because of the substantial risk of injury.79  The parties implicitly 
agreed that a person is not “qualified” if the disability poses a substantial risk 
of injury to the student or to others.80  The problem in Knapp was determining 
whose assessment of medical risk governs when the opinion of the team 
physician and the player’s medical experts conflict—the player, the team, or 
the court?81  Despite conflicting experts, the court concluded that the university 
has the right to determine a student’s medical ineligibility, deferring to the 
team physician decision as long as supported by “reason and rationality and 
with full regard to possible and reasonable accommodations.”82 
It did not make a difference to the court that Knapp and his parents were 
willing to execute liability waivers or that the risk of injury was to Knapp 
himself, a risk he was willing to take, as opposed to a risk posed to his 
 
 75. Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 486 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 76. Id. at 482. 
 77. Id. at 480–82. 
 78. Id. at 480–81 (noting that Knapp, like other students, was capable of “learning” without 
participation in intercollegiate sports).  If Knapp were a professional athlete, perhaps his 
“disability” would differ, having a stronger interest in participation because his livelihood, and 
ability to work, would be at stake. 
 79. Id. at 482. 
 80. Knapp, 101 F.3d at 483. 
 81. See Matthew J. Mitten, Enhanced Risk of Harm to One’s Self as a Justification for 
Exclusion from Athletics, 8 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 189, 215 (1998) (asserting that a model according 
deference to the team physician, if supported by a reasonable medical basis, appropriately 
balances an athlete’s interest in participation and the team or sponsor’s interest in protecting the 
health and safety of its participants); cf. Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789, 793–95 
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (ordering the university to allow a student with sight in one eye to play football, 
accepting the player’s ophthalmologist’s opinion that participation did not pose a substantial risk 
of serious eye injury and rejecting the team physician’s contrary opinion).  In Wright, the court 
held that the university’s laudable concern for student safety cannot derogate from a student’s 
rights under the Rehabilitation Act, “which prohibits ‘paternalistic authorities’ from deciding that 
certain activities are ‘too risky’ for a handicapped person.”  Id. at 794. 
 82. Knapp, 101 F.3d at 484. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
150 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:137 
teammates.83  Some schools have reluctantly allowed athletes with heart and 
other ailments to compete, but only after negotiating carefully drafted waivers 
of liability.84 
The Knapp court justified exclusion based on this risk of harm that 
participation would pose to Knapp himself.85  The ADA provides a defense 
when the disabled person poses a risk of harm to others, yet says nothing 
regarding when the risk of harm is to one’s self.86  The Supreme Court, 
however, has since clarified that the defense extends to a direct threat to self.87  
Thus, the university was justified in its determination, provided that the 
exclusion due to risk is based upon an individualized medical or scientific 
determination, and not based on fear or even good intentions.88  The risk to self 
versus others issue ties into the question about the participation and privacy 
rights of athletes with contagious diseases, such as the AIDS virus.  In 
Montalvo v. Radcliffe,89 the court held it permissible to exclude a boy who was 
HIV positive from participation in full contact karate classes because of the 
significant risk to other participants’ health and safety.90  In ruling, the 
Montalvo court noted the risk factors included the likelihood of blood-to-blood 
contact; the unknown probability of HIV transmission; the severity of a fatal 
disease; and the view of public health authorities that universal precautions 
and/or eye coverings and gloves would not eliminate risk to an insignificant 
level.91 
 
 83. See id. at 476. 
 84. Cf. Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist. No. 105-157-166J, 758 P.2d 968, 969–70 (Wash. 
1988) (holding exculpatory releases of the school district’s negligence, signed as a condition of 
participation in interscholastic athletics, invalid as contrary to public policy); Andrew Manno, 
Note, A High Price to Compete: The Feasibility and Effect of Waivers Used to Protect Schools 
from Liability for Injuries to Athletes with High Medical Risks, 79 KY. L.J. 867, 874–75 (1991) 
(asserting that waivers may inadequately protect schools from liability if an athlete later 
challenges on grounds of misrepresentation, fraud, incapacity, or contrary to public policy). 
 85. Knapp, 101 F.3d at 483. 
 86. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2000). 
 87. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 86–87 (2002) (holding that EEOC 
regulations authorizing the refusal to hire an individual whose performance on the job would 
endanger his own health, due to a disability, did not exceed the scope of permissible rulemaking 
under the ADA). 
 88. See Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342, 345 (D. Az. 1992) 
(finding an ADA violation because no proof that on-field coaching in a wheelchair poses a direct 
threat to others’ health and safety). 
 89. 167 F.3d 873 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 90. Id. at 874.  See generally John T. Wolohan, An Ethical and Legal Dilemma: 
Participation in Sports by HIV Infected Athletes, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 373 (1997); Anthony 
DiMaggio, Comment, Suffering in Silence: Should They Be Cheered or Feared? (Mandatory HIV 
Testing of Athletes as a Health and Safety Issue), 8 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 663 (1998). 
 91. Montalvo, 167 F.3d at 877–78. 
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In summary, the Supreme Court in Knapp stated: 
Legitimate physical qualifications may in fact be essential to participation in 
particular programs. . . . 
. . . . 
A significant risk of personal physical injury can disqualify a person from a 
position if the risk cannot be eliminated. . . . But more than merely an elevated 
risk of injury is required before disqualification is appropriate. . . . Any 
physical qualification based on risk of future injury must be examined with 
special care if the [law] is not to be circumvented, since almost all disabled 
individuals are at a greater risk of injury.92 
Courts tend to defer to the assessments of the team/athletic program to exclude 
from participation athletes with severe medical impairments or even those at 
high risk of medical impairments, provided the exclusion on the basis of direct 
threat to the student or others is based on an individualized and scientific 
determination, and not merely a subjective evaluation or good faith belief.93 
 
 92. Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 482–83 (7th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).  
See generally Matthew J. Mitten, Amateur Athletes with Handicaps or Physical Abnormalities: 
Who Makes the Participation Decision?, 71 NEB. L. REV. 987 (1992) (addressing the conflicts 
faced by disabled athletes, sports medicine physicians, and schools in determining whether the 
athlete can participate in sports); Cathy J. Jones, College Athletes: Illness of Injury and the 
Decision to Return to Play, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 113 (1992) (discussing whether college athletes 
should be afforded the same rights as other adults in making decisions concerning their medical 
care and daily activities); Adam A. Milani, Can I Play?: The Dilemma of the Disabled Athlete in 
Interscholastic Sports, 49 ALA. L. REV. 817 (1998) (discussing the elements of the ADA and 
Rehabilitation Act and their application to student-athletes); Matthew J. Mitten, Team Physicians 
& Competitive Athletes: Allocating Legal Responsibility for Athletic Injuries, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 
129 (1993) (discussing pressures, obligations, and conflicts facing team physicians); Robert E. 
Shepard, Jr., Why Can’t Johnny Read or Play? The Participation Rights of Handicapped Student-
Athletes, 1 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 163 (1991) (addressing the discriminatory and exclusionary 
practices faced by handicapped athletes in collegiate sports). 
 93. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 648–49 (1998); see also Mantolete v. Bolger, 
767 F.2d 1416, 1422 (9th Cir. 1985).  In Mantolete, the court addressed the standard to apply in 
determining if an individual is otherwise physically qualified to perform an activity when the 
possibility of future injury exists, stating that 
in order to exclude such individuals, there must be a showing of a reasonable probability 
of substantial harm.  Such a determination cannot be based merely on an employer’s 
subjective evaluation or, except in cases of a most apparent nature, merely on medical 
reports.  The question is whether, in light of the individual’s work history and medical 
history, employment of that individual would pose a reasonable probability of substantial 
harm. 
. . . . 
  In applying this standard, an employer must gather all relevant information regarding 
the applicant’s work history and medical history, and independently assess both the 
probability and severity of potential injury.  This involves, of course, a case-by-case 
analysis of the applicant and the particular job. 
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B. Disabled Athletes Who Fail to Meet a “Neutral” Eligibility Requirement 
In competitive sports, governing athletic organizations, teams, and schools 
generally establish eligibility criteria, which are intended to protect the health 
and safety of athletes and to maintain the integrity of the competition.  When 
universally applied, however, the effect of “imposition” of these seemingly 
neutral eligibility criteria may be to screen out or exclude some athletes with 
disabilities from participation.  Thus, for example, neutral requirements such as 
age limitations in interscholastic sports programs or academic eligibility 
standards for participation in interscholastic or intercollegiate athletics may 
have the effect of discriminating against students who were held back in school 
because of disability, or who could not meet the academic standards because of 
specialized education courses or learning disabilities.  Do these athletes with 
disabilities excluded from participation on this basis have rights to participate, 
or can the programs strictly enforce their eligibility standards? 
1. Age Restrictions 
The federal courts are divided on whether interscholastic age eligibility 
rules violate the federal anti-discrimination laws when applied to students who 
exceed the age limits and were held back in school because of a disability.  The 
Sixth and Eighth Circuits have upheld age limitation rules, reasoning in part 
that such rules are essential to promote the safety of younger athletes and to 
maintain a competitive balance in interscholastic athletics by precluding 
physically more mature students.94  According to these courts, waiver of the 
rule would fundamentally alter the nature of interscholastic competition and 
pose an undue administrative burden on the associations to assess competitive 
fairness in individual cases.95  The Second and Eleventh Circuits declined to 
address, on grounds of mootness,96 the merits of two cases in which the district 
courts had enjoined enforcement of age rules.97 
 
Id. at 1422–23. 
 94. See Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 64 F.3d 1026, 1037 (6th Cir. 
1995) (holding the age limit rule did not violate either the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA); 
Pottgen v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass’n., 40 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding the 
age limit rule was an essential eligibility requirement supported by health and safety concerns and 
that modification would be unreasonable). 
 95. Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1035 (“It is plainly an undue burden to require high school coaches 
and hired physicians to determine whether . . . a student’s age [is] an unfair competitive 
advantage. . . . It is unreasonable to call upon coaches and physicians to make these near-
impossible determinations.”); Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 930 (“Waiving an essential eligibility standard 
would constitute a fundamental alteration in the nature of the baseball program. . . . [N]o 
reasonable accommodations exist.”). 
 96. Claims by student athletes seeking rights to participate are usually made in the context of 
a motion for preliminary injunction.  Because of the short timing of the sports season, the 
plaintiffs’ claims may quickly become moot whether injunctive relief is granted or not.  
Accordingly, the courts test whether the plaintiff can demonstrate irreparable harm and a 
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Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n, Inc.98 emphasized that 
the age requirement was a neutral rule applicable to all students and that the 
plaintiffs were excluded from participation only in their senior years and 
“solely by reason of” their age, not disability.99  The Court did not find it 
relevant that the plaintiffs were delayed in their schooling as a result of their 
learning disabilities.100  Johnson v. Florida High School Activities Ass’n, 
Inc.101 focused on whether waiving the requirement fundamentally alters the 
purposes of the rule.102  The courts differ on whether an athletic association is 
obligated under federal law to conduct an individualized evaluation of whether 
waiver of the age limit rule is a reasonable accommodation to a particular 
student.  Johnson conducted an individualized inquiry, analyzing whether 
granting a waiver in the plaintiff’s individual case would undermine the 
legitimate purposes of the age limit rule.103  A number of commentators 
analyzing this issue have argued that the individualized approach taken by 
 
substantial likelihood of success on the merits of an ADA or Rehabilitation Act claim.  See 
Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1030.  The appeal in Sandison was not moot as to the penalty imposed on 
schools, such as forfeiture of season games, for allowing students who exceed the age limit to 
participate.  Id. 
 97. See Dennin v. Conn. Interscholastic Athletic Conference, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 663, 670 (D. 
Ct. 1996), vacated as moot, 94 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 1996) (lower court recognizing that although 
the age requirement was facially neutral with regard to disabilities, the rule was discriminatory 
when applied to a particular student whose disability was the sole reason he was held back in 
school; appellate court reversing and vacating as moot because plaintiff had participated under the 
district court’s injunction and graduated); Johnson v. Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass’n, Inc., 899 F. 
Supp. 579, 585–86 (M.D. Fla. 1995), vacated as moot, 102 F.3d. 1172, 1173 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(lower court conducting an individualized assessment and holding that waiver of the age rule was 
a reasonable modification for the learning disabled student; appellate court vacating as moot 
because Johnson was finished competing in high school athletics). 
 98. 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 99. Id. at 1032. 
 100. See id. at 1028. 
 101. 899 F. Supp. 579 (M.D. Fla. 1995). 
 102. Id. at 584.  The Johnson court acknowledged the salutary purposes served by the age 
limitation rule, but determined, based on an individualized assessment, that in Johnson’s case, 
waiver of the age rule was a reasonable accommodation.  Id. at 586.  The court cited to factors 
such as that the plaintiff was of average size and ability and did not intentionally delay his 
education to get an athletic advantage.  Id. at 585.  The district court in Dennin used similar 
reasoning in ordering a waiver of the age restriction to allow a nineteen-year-old student with 
Down’s Syndrome to participate in intercollegiate swimming.  913 F. Supp. at 666, 669, 671.  
The court ruled that a waiver would not undermine the purposes of the rule, given that the student 
was not a safety risk in competitive swimming, a noncontact sport, and did not have a competitive 
advantage, as one of the slowest swimmers on the team.  Id. at 669; cf. Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1037 
(holding that requiring individual competitive fairness determinations is an undue administrative 
burden).  Arguably, this individualized assessment protects athletes who are not that good or 
strong anyway and perhaps penalizes student athletes with disabilities who are exceptionally 
skilled, strong, large, or talented. 
 103. 899 F. Supp. at 586. 
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Johnson is more consistent with the purpose of the ADA and legislative 
intent.104  This approach has gained increased recognition, notably adopted by 
the Seventh Circuit in holding that waiver of a sports eligibility rule is a 
“reasonable accommodation” under the ADA if waiver in the particular case 
would not require a “fundamental and unreasonable change” in the rule.105 
2. Academic Requirements for Athletic Eligibility 
Another area in which student-athletes with disabilities may be excluded 
from participation is in the context of meeting academic requirements to attain 
eligibility to participate in interscholastic or intercollegiate athletics.  For 
example, the NCAA has established and enforced minimum initial academic 
eligibility requirements that entering freshman must meet in order to 
participate in Division I and II intercollegiate athletics.106  To qualify under 
NCAA standards, students must satisfy initial eligibility requirements 
including the completion of a certain number of high school “core” academic 
courses and attaining a minimum score based on an index of a grade point 
average in these courses on national standardized exams.107  The stated 
purpose of these requirements is to protect the integrity of intercollegiate 
athletics and to ensure, by uniform standards, that student-athletes are 
academically prepared to succeed in college.108 
Student-athletes with learning disabilities have claimed that imposition of 
academic standards discriminate against them in violation of federal disability 
 
 104. See, e.g., Milani, supra note 92, at 907–08; John T. Wolohan, Are Age Restrictions a 
Necessary Requirement for Participation in Interscholastic Athletic Programs?, 66 UMKC L. 
REV. 345, 379–80 (1997); Katie M. Burroughs, Learning Disabled Student Athletes: A Sporting 
Chance Under the ADA?, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 57, 65 (1997); Colleen M. Evale, 
Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Association: The Sixth Circuit Sets Up Age 
Restrictions as Insurmountable Hurdles for Learning Disabled High School Student-Athletes, 5 
SPORTS LAW. J. 109, 136–37 (1998). 
 105. See Washington v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 181 F.3d 840, 842, 850 (7th Cir. 
1999) (requiring individualized determination of waiver of eight-semester rule); see also Cruz v. 
Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 485, 499–500 (E.D. Pa. 2001) 
(concluding that waiver of the maximum age rule for a learning disabled student would not 
fundamentally alter high school sports program); Dennin, 913 F. Supp. at 670 (noting that age 
rule, although facially neutral with regard to disabilities, is discriminatory when applied to a 
particular student whose disability was the sole reason he was held back in school). 
 106. See Weston, supra note 14, at 1052. 
 107. Id. at 1052–53. 
 108. Cole v. NCAA, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1063 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (noting that NCAA 
“[e]ligibility requirements shall be designed to assure proper emphasis on educational objectives, 
to promote competitive equity among institutions and to prevent exploitation of student-
athletes”). 
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discrimination laws.109  Because of their learning disabilities, many students 
have a specialized high school curriculum that does not meet the NCAA’s 
definition of “core” academic courses.  Many of these students contend the 
NCAA’s imposition of a minimum grade and testing score penalizes them due 
to their learning disabilities.  The question raised in these cases is whether the 
ADA precludes organizations such as the NCAA from enforcing academic 
eligibility requirements as a condition for participating in intercollegiate 
athletics and requires modification of these standards for students with learning 
disabilities.110 
The court in Ganden v. NCAA111 determined that such a request was 
unreasonable, thereby rejecting the claim of a highly recruited swimmer 
diagnosed with a learning disability since second grade to compel the NCAA 
to modify its core course criteria to accept remedial courses taken as part of his 
special education curriculum and to modify its GPA criteria.112  In its holding, 
the court stated: 
Whatever criticism one may level at GPA and the national standardized tests, 
these provide significant objective predictors of a student’s ability to succeed 
at college.  The “core course” criteria further serves the dual interest[s] of 
insuring the integrity of that GPA and independently insuring that the student 
has covered the minimum subject matter required for college.113 
The court determined that although the ADA requires an individualized 
assessment of a learning-disabled student’s case, the law does not require the 
NCAA to abandon its eligibility requirements, lower its standards, or make 
modifications that “fundamentally alter” its rules and programs.114 
Similar claims by athletes with learning disabilities have met varied results 
in the courts.  One possible explanation is that the courts or sporting authorities 
are suspicious of the diagnosis or cause of the failure to meet the 
requirements.115  In Tatum v. NCAA,116 after Justin Tatum failed to attain the 
minimum score on the ACT needed for NCAA eligibility, his guidance 
counselor, “[c]oncerned with the possible loss of [his] scholarship offer,” 
 
 109. See, e.g., Tatum v. NCAA, 992 F. Supp. 1114, 1116 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (student-athlete 
sued NCAA alleging discrimination when NCAA denied him eligibility after refusing to 
recognize student’s standardized test score earned while taking the exam untimed). 
 110. See Doe v. Haverford Sch., No. Civ. A. 03-3989, 2003 WL 22097782, at *4–5 (E.D. Pa. 
Aug. 5, 2003) (applying Title III of the ADA to a private school). 
 111. No. 96 C 6953, 1996 WL 680000 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 1996). 
 112. Id. at *1–5, *17. 
 113. Id. at *15. 
 114. Id. at *14–16. 
 115. In Ganden, the court agreed with the NCAA that Ganden’s remedial typing and 
computer courses had little substantive similarity to the core course criteria.  Id. at *15; see also 
Weston, supra note 14, at 1080. 
 116. 992 F. Supp. 1114 (E.D. Mo. 1998). 
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recommended that he be evaluated for learning disabilities.117  The first 
evaluator concluded that Tatum did not have a learning disability and needed 
to spend more time on his studies; thereafter, a second evaluator diagnosed 
Tatum with generalized anxiety disorder and a test-taking phobia and 
recommended he retake the ACT with accommodations.118  The testing 
agencies accepted the diagnosis and provided him nonstandard, untimed 
conditions for subsequent tests.119  After three more attempts, Tatum finally 
made the qualifying score, which the NCAA refused to accept.120  The NCAA 
required Tatum to undergo additional evaluation, in which the evaluator found 
Tatum had a problem with test-taking, but not a learning disability.121  
Although educational and psychiatric authorities recognized generalized 
anxiety disorder and test-taking phobias as “learning disabilities,” the NCAA 
refused to recognize Tatum as disabled and to modify its requirements.122  The 
court agreed, finding the timing of Tatum’s diagnosis suspect and agreeing that 
he had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of an ADA 
claim.123  Even where a student-athlete had a long-standing record of a learning 
disability, sporting authorities have been reluctant, absent litigation, to modify 
academic eligibility requirements.124 
The NCAA has sought dismissal of ADA-related litigation on the grounds 
“that it is not a place of public accommodation and that it does not own, lease 
or operate a place of public accommodation,” contending it was not subject to 
the ADA.125  The court in Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n closely 
analyzed this issue, determining the NCAA is subject to the ADA because of 
its significant power to control, manage, or regulate places of public 
 
 117. Id. at 1117. 
 118. Id. at 1117–18. 
 119. Id. at 1118. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Tatum, 992 F. Supp. at 1118. 
 122. See id. at 1118. 
 123. Id. at 1123; see also Ganden v. NCAA, No. 96 C 6953, 1996 WL 680000, at *1 (N.D. 
Ill. Nov. 21, 1996) (noting that student-athlete spent five hours a day swimming as reason for 
failure to meet academic requirements); Matthews v. NCAA, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1216 (E.D. 
Wash. 2001) (noting that the NCAA argued student with learning disability failed to meet 
requirement due to lack of effort). 
 124. For example, the NCAA refused to extend eligibility (absent litigation) to student-
athletes, all of whom had received special education services to accommodate learning disabilities 
prior to high school, in the following cases: Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *1, *17 (upholding 
NCAA’s refusal to extend eligibility where athlete’s high school course work fell short of its 
eligibility requirements); Butler v. NCAA, No. C96-1656D, 1996 WL 1058233, at *1–3 (W.D. 
Wash. Nov. 8, 1996) (examining NCAA’s refusal to accept athlete’s high school special 
education courses, with the NCAA resisting on the grounds that it is not subject to Title III of the 
ADA); Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 467 (D.N.J. 1998). 
 125. See, e.g., Bowers, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 483. 
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accommodations, such as stadiums, and its control and regulation of 
participation through academic eligibility standards.126 
As to whether modification of academic eligibility requirements 
constitutes a fundamental alteration, the NCAA has argued that its standards 
do not unfairly screen out students with disabilities and that a reduction in 
eligibility standards would constitute a fundamental alteration of its 
program.127  The Bowers court initially determined that these standards were 
essential to “maintain intercollegiate athletes as an integral part of the 
educational program” and to assure that those representing an institution in 
intercollegiate athletics progress in their education.128  Co-defendant 
University of Iowa, which allegedly stopped recruiting Bowers after it received 
his transcripts indicating special education courses, also asserted that Bowers 
was not a “qualified individual” with a disability.129  As Northwestern 
successfully asserted in Knapp, Iowa argued that Bowers was not disabled 
simply because he could not participate in intercollegiate sports.130  Iowa also 
argued that Bowers was not discriminated against “because of” his learning 
disability, but was instead denied eligibility due to his failure to fulfill the core 
course and GPA requirements.131  In a later ruling on summary judgment, the 
same court rejected both arguments, holding that the defendants had not 
proved the eligibility requirements were essential to the maintenance of 
intercollegiate athletics, and requiring an individualized, rather than purely 
numerical, assessment of a student’s ability to comport with program goals.132 
In response to the foregoing discrimination complaints filed by student-
athletes with learning disabilities, the United States Department of Justice 
 
 126. Id. at 489; see also supra Section II.C.1. 
 127. See, e.g., Bowers, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 477, 500 (denying Bowers’s request for a preliminary 
injunction); see also Weston, supra note 14, at 1086–88. 
 128. See Bowers, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 467. 
 129. Id. at 467, 475. 
 130. Id. at 476.  Contrast Knapp v. Northwestern University, 101 F.3d 473, 478–82 (7th Cir. 
1996), which held that a student’s heart condition did not constitute a disability because the 
student was only limited in playing intercollegiate sports, which by itself is not a major life 
activity, with Bowers, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 475–76, involving a student who was “disabled” under the 
ADA not because of a limitation on his ability to play college sports but because of a limitation 
on his capacity to learn, and was denied the ability to participate in, among other things, 
intercollegiate football due to that disability.  See also Weston, supra note 14, at 1087–88; Susan 
M. Denbo, Disability Lessons in Higher Education: Accommodating Learning-Disabled Students 
and Student-Athletes Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 41 
AM. BUS. L.J. 145, 174–75 (2003) (noting that many schools fail to raise the “obvious” argument 
that participation in sports is not a substantial limitation that renders one disabled). 
 131. Bowers, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 476. 
 132. Id. at 478.  The court acknowledged that although the NCAA has a “waiver procedure” 
that allows students to apply for an exception to the rules, the waiver decisions are made too late, 
only after students are enrolled in a college and have lost recruiting and scholarship opportunities.  
Id. at 476–77. 
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(DOJ), charged with enforcement of Title III of the ADA, investigated the 
NCAA’s initial eligibility certification process.133  The DOJ determined that 
several aspects of the NCAA’s initial eligibility requirements violated Title III 
of the ADA, in particular the “core course” definition that explicitly excluded 
any remedial, special education, or compensatory courses.134  On May 26, 
1998, the NCAA entered into a Consent Decree with the DOJ agreeing to 
revise certain procedures and policies with respect to student-athletes with 
learning disabilities.135  The NCAA entered the Consent Decree even though 
no court had yet ruled that a learning disabled student-athlete had a reasonable 
probability of succeeding on the merits of a disability discrimination claim 
against the NCAA.136  Expressly in the Consent Decree, however, the NCAA 
maintains that it is not subject to Title III of the ADA and denies any liability 
under the ADA.137  The Consent Decree expired by its own terms May 1, 
2003.138  The NCAA continues to provide a process for accommodating 
students with learning disabilities.139 
In the few court decisions issued since the Consent Decree, the NCAA has 
continued to assert that it is not subject to the ADA, yet this argument has less 
force with the courts since the Consent Decree and the decision in Martin v. 
PGA.140  Other researchers have noted that “[a] review of cases decided before 
and after the Consent Decree was signed illustrates that it has not yet 
 
 133. Consent Decree, United States v. NCAA (D.D.C. May 26, 1998) [hereinafter Decree], 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/ncaa.htm. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See id.  Under the Decree, the NCAA agreed to certify as “core courses” classes 
designed for students with disabilities that provide them with the same type of knowledge and 
skills as other college-bound students; permit ineligible learning disabled students to earn a fourth 
year of eligibility by making substantial progress towards an academic degree; include experts on 
learning disabilities in evaluating waiver applications; and pay $35,000 to four student athletes 
who had filed complaints with the DOJ.  Id. 
 136. See id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Decree, supra note 133. 
This Consent Decree shall remain in effect until May 1, 2003. At that time, this Consent 
Decree shall terminate unless the United States moves for cause for an extension.  This 
Court [the District Court for the District of Columbia] retains jurisdiction over this case 
for the purpose of deciding any issue that may arise under this Consent Decree, and for 
purposes of enforcement of this Consent Decree. Any party may bring such issues before 
the Court by filing an appropriate motion. 
Id. 
 139. See generally NCAA Student-Athlete Eligibility FAQ, http://www1.ncaa.org/ 
membership/membership_svcs/eligibility-recruiting/faqs/disabilities (last visited Nov. 16, 2005). 
 140. See, e.g., Matthews v. NCAA, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1222–23 (E.D. Wash. 2001) 
(holding that Title III applied to the NCAA based on the NCAA’s large degree of control over 
students’ access to the arena of college athletics); see also Kelly M. Trainor, Note, The NCAA’s 
Initial Eligibility Requirements and the Americans with Disabilities Act in the Post-PGA Tour, 
Inc. v. Martin Era: An Argument in Favor of Deference to the NCAA, 46 B.C. L. REV 423 (2005). 
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significantly improved a learning-disabled student’s chances of successfully 
challenging an NCAA certification decision.”141  Because the law would 
require the NCAA to analyze waiver requests on an individualized basis, 
obviously not all requests need be granted.  The court in Matthews v. NCAA 
required waiver for a learning disabled student from the NCAA rule requiring 
75% credit hours be taken during the school year, so long as the student 
“maintains the minimum grade point average and progression toward his 
degree.”142  The court held that this was a necessary and reasonable 
modification of NCAA bylaws and not a fundamental alteration the NCAA’s 
purpose.143  By contrast, the court in Cole v. NCAA,144 deferred to the NCAA 
and stated that Title III “does not require an institution to ‘lower or to effect 
substantial modifications of standards to accommodate a handicapped 
person.’”145 
C. Athletes Who Need Accommodation or Modification to Rules of Play 
Under the questions previously explored, courts or sporting authorities 
determined eligibility to compete on the basis of medical or academic fitness 
standards but did not intervene in the actual rules of play and competition.146  
Application of the disability laws becomes more controversial and perhaps 
problematic when the laws appear to require modifications or accommodations 
to actual rules of play or competition for disabled athletes, particularly at the 
professional level.  Should the law distinguish between rules defining who is 
eligible to compete from rules governing how the game is played, with any 
modification to the latter “substantive” rules as a per se fundamental 
alteration?147  Most professional teams or organizations do not receive federal 
financial assistance and are not covered by the Rehabilitation Act.  In the few 
disability discrimination cases brought by professional athletes, the athletes 
have invoked Title I (employment) and Title III (public accommodations) of 
the ADA to seek legal relief. 
 
 141. Denbo, supra note 130, at 193; see Jenny Blayden & Cynthia Pemberton, An 
Investigation of NCAA Initial Eligibility Waiver Applications and Awards from 1999 to 2001, 13 
J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 39, 50 (2003) (stating that “[d]espite voluntary agreement with the 
Justice Department as articulated by the Consent Decree, as well as evolving case law, the NCAA 
has consistently rejected the notion that it is a place of public accommodation and therefore 
legally compelled to comply with Title III of the ADA” and urging continued tracking and 
accountability of NCAA compliance). 
 142. Matthews, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1231. 
 143. Id. 
 144. 120 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (N.D. Ga. 2000). 
 145. Id. at 1070 (quoting Pottgen v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 40 F.3d 926, 931 
(8th Cir. 1994)). 
 146. See supra discussion in Parts III.A–B. 
 147. The PGA set forth this argument, among others, in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 
661, 670 (2001). 
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The case prompting national attention and debate on this question involved 
Casey Martin, a professional golfer, who due to a severe congenital disability 
affecting his right leg, sought to compel the PGA to waive its “no cart” rule 
and permit him to ride a cart during PGA competitions.148  The PGA did not 
contest that Martin was disabled; however, it argued that the ADA does not 
apply to professional golf tournaments,149 and moreover, that walking is an 
essential substantive rule of competition and any modification would 
fundamentally alter the nature of the competition.150 
The Court’s opinion focused on whether modification of the no-cart rule 
for Martin to participate in PGA professional golf competitions was reasonable 
or would fundamentally alter the nature of the game.151  Thus, acknowledging 
that the ADA requires “reasonable accommodation” for qualified individuals 
with a disability, the debate centered on when accommodation to rules of 
competitive play is ever “reasonable”?152  From the PGA’s view, walking is 
integral to the spirit and conduct of the game of golf; riding in a cart is a 
decided advantage to a player; the PGA Tour is entitled to set its own rules of 
play without interference of the courts; and the no-cart rule was necessary to 
ensure competition fairness and a level playing field.153  The PGA also argued 
that the purpose of the walking rule is to inject the element of fatigue into the 
skill of shot-making and that changing the rule would fundamentally alter the 
competition.154  Martin adduced evidence that riding in a cart is not necessarily 
an advantage, that in many ways it is a disadvantage, and that most players 
would not use a cart even if permitted.155 
The Court framed the question as whether the walking rule could be 
modified to accommodate Martin without fundamentally altering the nature of 
the game being played at the PGA Tour’s tournaments.156  The Court noted 
 
 148. Id. at 668–69. 
 149. See id. at 678.  The Court’s ruling with respect to the application of the ADA to the PGA 
is discussed in Section II.C.1.  See also id. at 678–80 (analyzing the PGA as a “public 
accommodation” subject to the ADA on (among other) grounds that, although Martin was a 
competitor, and not “clients or customers” of a public accommodation, “it would be entirely 
appropriate to classify the golfers who pay petitioner $3,000 for the chance to compete in the Q-
School and, if successful, in the subsequent tour events, as petitioner’s clients or customers”). 
 150. Id. at 670. 
 151. Id. at 681–91. 
 152. See PGA, 532 U.S. at 681–91. 
 153. Id. at 670–671; see also W. Kent Davis, Why is the PGA Teed Off at Casey Martin? An 
Example of How the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Has Changed Sports Law, 9 MARQ. 
SPORTS L.J. 1, 41–43 (1998) (citing the varied comments of the public and professional golfers 
responding to the Martin accommodation issue). 
 154. PGA, 532 U.S. at 686. 
 155. Id. at 687–88.  In testimony at trial, professional golfer Eric Johnson indicated that 
walking might even be an advantage, as it helps keep him “in rhythm.”  Id. at 688. 
 156. Id. at 682. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2005] THE INTERSECTION OF SPORTS AND DISABILITY 161 
that the Rules of Golf permitted cart use and otherwise said nothing requiring 
or defining walking as part of the game.157  The Court treated the PGA’s 
fatigue argument with slight sarcasm, noting “the factual basis of petitioner’s 
argument is undermined by the District Court’s finding that the fatigue from 
walking during one of petitioner’s 4-day tournaments cannot be deemed 
significant.”158  Although acknowledging that fatigue was part of the game, the 
Court found “it is an uncontested finding of the District Court that Martin 
‘easily endures greater fatigue even with a cart than his able-bodied 
competitors do by walking.’”159  In these cases, the central issue is whether 
allowing the plaintiff, given his individual circumstances, the requested 
modification of using a cart in tournament competition would fundamentally 
alter PGA golf competitions.160  In holding the walking rule “at best 
peripheral” to the nature of the PGA competition and that waiver of the rule for 
Martin was reasonable, the Court considered this consistent with 
Congressional intent to require entities such as the PGA to give individualized 
attention to requests of disabled athletes for access to participation in 
competition.161 
Even the members of the Court were divided.  Was Martin getting an 
unfair advantage?  Is walking integral to the game?  What is a level playing 
field?  Where do we draw the line?162  Justice Scalia, joined by Justice 
Thomas, argued in dissent that sport is different from other enterprises which 
are subject to the ADA and that no court, “not even the Supreme Court of the 
United States,” can pronounce one or another of the competitive rules of sport 
 
 157. Id. at 666. 
 158. Id. at 687 (citing evidence presented at trial showing that fatigue in golf was more 
attributable to dehydration and heat exhaustion and that one burns only 500 calories in a five-hour 
round of golf, “nutritionally . . . less than a Big Mac”). 
 159. PGA, 532 U.S. at 690 (citing Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1252 (D. Or. 
1998)). 
 160. Id. at 682. 
 161. Id. at 689–91. 
 162. Based on Martin, the Supreme Court summarily vacated the Seventh Circuit ruling that 
denied the request by Ford Olinger, a professional golfer with a degenerative hip disorder, for 
injunctive relief to ride a cart in the U.S. Open.  See Olinger v. USGA, 18 Fed. App’x. 409, 409 
(7th Cir. 2001).  The Seventh Circuit had affirmed the district court’s ruling that “the nature of 
the competition would be fundamentally altered” if the walking rule were eliminated because it 
would “remove stamina (at least, a particular type of stamina) from the set of qualities designed to 
be tested in this competition.”  Olinger v. USGA, 55 F. Supp. 2d 926, 937 (N.D. Ind. 1999), aff’d, 
205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 532 U.S. 1064 (2001).  The Seventh 
Circuit had determined that the administrative burdens of evaluating requests to waive the 
walking rule were undue, in that the United States Golf Association (USGA) “would need to 
develop a system and a fund of expertise to determine whether a given applicant truly needs, or 
merely wants, or could use but does not need, to ride a cart to compete.”  Olinger, 205 F.3d at 
1007 (stating that “the decision on whether the rules of the game should be adjusted to 
accommodate him is best left to those who hold the future of golf in trust”). 
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nonessential if the rulemaker deems them otherwise.163  As posed by Justice 
Scalia, why must the PGA play “classic ‘essential’ golf?”164  How does a 
sporting entity or a court determine whether the rule or policy that a disabled 
athlete seeks to modify would alter a fundamental aspect of the competition?  
What is discrimination on the basis of disability when it comes to sports and 
athletic competition?  Justice Scalia was concerned about “line drawing” 
problems and unwarranted judicial interference.  He posed a seemingly absurd 
scenario where a Little League player with attention deficit disorder, whose 
disability “makes it at least 25% more difficult to hit a pitched ball,” should 
receive the accommodation of four strikes absent “a judicial determination 
that, in baseball, three strikes are metaphysically necessary.”165 
Courts have not interpreted Martin to require an affirmative response to 
many accommodation requests.  In Kuketz v. Petronelli,166 a nationally ranked 
wheelchair racquetball player sued to be allowed to compete with footed 
players in the athletic club’s “A” racquetball league and requested a rule 
modification to allow him two bounces before returning the ball, as was legal 
in wheelchair racquetball, rather than one bounce.167  Relying on the analysis 
in Martin, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that while the essence of 
golf was hitting a stationary ball with a club, the essence of racquetball was 
hitting a moving ball with a racquet before the second bounce.168  Allowing a 
player two bounces would fundamentally change the nature of the game.169  
Implicit in wheelchair racquetball’s official rules was the assumption that all 
players were in wheelchairs.170 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Recent media attention has focused on the tragedy of some perfectly 
healthy athletes, still not satisfied, who turn to purported performance-
enhancing drugs in order to strive to become the best in their respective sports 
competitions.  In many respects, athletes with disabilities are perhaps more 
 
 163. PGA, 532 U.S. at 700. 
 164. Id. at 699. 
 165. Id. at 702–03. 
 166. 821 N.E.2d 473 (Mass. 2005). 
 167. Id. at 474. 
 168. Id. at 479. 
 169. Id. at 479–80. 
 170. See id. at 480. 
Giving a wheelchair player two bounces and a footed player one bounce in head-to-head 
competition is a variation of the official rules that would “alter such an essential aspect of 
the game . . . that it would be unacceptable even if it affected all competitors equally.”  
The modifications sought by Kuketz create a new game, with new strategies and new 
rules.  The club is certainly free to establish or enter into a league that plays this variation 
of racquetball, but it is not required by the ADA to do so. 
Id. at 479–80 (quoting PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 682 (2001)). 
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worthy of participation than non-disabled athletes—they have worked equally 
hard to develop their athletic skills—yet they may be denied the opportunity to 
participate because of a disability, medical impairment, or need for 
accommodation in either the rules of play or participation.  An equally 
compelling consideration, however, is the obligation of athletic programs to 
ensure the health and safety of athletes, as well as to ensure fairness in 
competitive play. 
The federal disability laws provide athletes with disabilities a vital 
mechanism to ensure that decisions regarding their rights to participate in 
athletics are thoughtfully considered, medically justified, and not disregarded 
simply upon notions of undue administrative burdens, false notions of 
competitive advantage, or paternalism.  The common thread among Martin and 
cases involving challenges by athletes with disabilities illustrates that sporting 
organizations should be prepared to explain the purpose of their eligibility 
requirements and rules of competition, to articulate the connection between the 
requirements and purpose, and to evaluate on an individual basis whether 
modification of such rules can be made without undermining this legitimate 
purpose or fundamentally altering the nature of the game.  The playing field 
becomes balanced when athletes with disabilities are also given an equal 
opportunity to participate. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
164 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:137 
 
